

111TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 1044

To preserve the ability of the United States to project power globally.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 14, 2009

Mr. THUNE introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred
to the Committee on Armed Services

A BILL

To preserve the ability of the United States to project power
globally.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Preserving Future
5 United States Capability to Project Power Globally Act
6 of 2009”.

7 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

8 Congress makes the following findings:

9 (1) Long-range strike is a critical mission in
10 which the United States needs to retain a credible
11 and dominant capability.

1 (2) Long range, penetrating strike systems pro-
2 vide—

3 (A) a hedge against being unable to obtain
4 access to forward bases for political reasons;

5 (B) a capacity to respond quickly to con-
6 tingencies such as the failure of a nuclear-
7 armed state;

8 (C) the ability to base outside the reach of
9 emerging adversary anti-access and area-denial
10 capabilities; and

11 (D) the ability to impose disproportionate
12 defensive costs on prospective adversaries of the
13 United States.

14 (3) The 2006 Quadrennial Review directed the
15 United States Air Force to “develop a new land-
16 based, penetrating long range strike capability to be
17 fielded by 2018”.

18 (4) Secretary of Defense Robert P. Gates has
19 publicly acknowledged the need for a next generation
20 bomber on at least three separate occasions:

21 (A) In a September 29, 2008, speech at
22 National Defense University, where Secretary
23 Gates said, “In the case of China, investments
24 in cyber-and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and
25 anti-ship weaponry, submarines, and ballistic

1 missiles could threaten America's primary
2 means to project power and help allies in the
3 Pacific: our bases, air and sea assets, and the
4 networks that support them. This will put a
5 premium on America's ability to strike from
6 over the horizon, employ missile defenses, and
7 will require shifts from short-range to longer-
8 range systems such as the next generation
9 bomber."

10 (B) In the January/February 2009 edition
11 of Foreign Affairs, in an article entitled, "A
12 Balanced Strategy; Reprogramming the Pen-
13 tagon for a New Age," where Secretary Gates
14 wrote, "In the case of China, Beijing's invest-
15 ments in cyberwarfare, antisatellite warfare,
16 antiaircraft and antiship weaponry, submarines,
17 and ballistic missiles could threaten the United
18 States' primary means to project its power and
19 help its allies in the Pacific: bases, air and sea
20 assets, and the networks that support them.
21 This will put a premium on the United States'
22 ability to strike from over the horizon and em-
23 ploy missile defenses and will require shifts
24 from short-range to longer-range systems, such
25 as the next generation bomber."

1 (C) In the First Quarter 2009 edition of
2 Joint Force Quarterly, in an article entitled,
3 “The National Defense Strategy; Striking the
4 Right Balance,” where Secretary Gates wrote,
5 “In the case of China, investments in cyber and
6 antisatellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship
7 weaponry, submarines, and ballistic missiles
8 could threaten America’s primary means to
9 project power and help allies in the Pacific: our
10 bases, air and sea assets, and the networks that
11 support them. This will put a premium on
12 America’s ability to strike from over the horizon
13 and employ missile defenses; and it will require
14 shifts from short-range to longer range systems
15 such as the next generation bomber.”

16 (5) On April 6, 2009, Secretary Gates an-
17 nounced that the United States “will not pursue a
18 development program for a follow-on Air Force
19 bomber until we have a better understanding of the
20 need, the requirement and the technology”.

21 (6) On May 7, 2009, President Barack Obama
22 announced the termination of the next generation
23 bomber program in the Office of Management and
24 Budget’s “Terminations, Reductions, and Savings”
25 document, stating that “there is no urgent need to

1 begin an expensive development program for a new
2 bomber” and that “the future bomber fleet may not
3 be affordable over the next six years.”

4 (7) The need, requirement, and the technology
5 for the next generation bomber are well understood,
6 as set out by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.

7 (8) The need for a new long-range strike capa-
8 bility is urgent because the conflicts of the future
9 will likely feature heavily defended airspace, due in
10 large part to the proliferation of relatively inexpen-
11 sive, but extremely sophisticated and deadly, air de-
12 fense systems.

13 (9) General Michael Maples, Director of the
14 Defense Intelligence Agency, noted during a March
15 10, 2009, Committee on Armed Services of the Sen-
16 ate hearing on worldwide threats that “Russia, quite
17 frankly, is the developer of most of those [advanced
18 air defense] systems and is exporting those systems
19 both to China and to other countries in the world”.

20 (10) The commanders of Pacific Command,
21 Strategic Command, and Joint Forces Command
22 have each testified in support of the capability that
23 the next generation bomber will provide before the
24 Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

1 (11) Nearly half of the United States bomber
2 inventory (47 percent) pre-dates the Cuban Missile
3 Crisis.

4 (12) The only air-breathing strike platforms the
5 United States possesses today with reach and surviv-
6 ability to have a chance of successfully executing
7 missions more than 1,000 nautical miles into enemy
8 territory from the last air-to-air refueling are 16
9 combat ready B-2 bombers.

10 (13) The B-2 was designed in the 1980s and
11 achieved initial operational capability over a decade
12 ago.

13 (14) The crash of an operational B-2 during
14 takeoff at Guam in early 2008 indicates that attri-
15 tion can and does occur even in peacetime.

16 (15) The primary mission requirement of the
17 next generation bomber is the ability to strike tar-
18 gets anywhere on the globe with whatever weapons
19 the contingency requires.

20 (16) The requisite aerodynamic, structural, and
21 low-observable technologies to develop the next gen-
22 eration bomber already exist in fifth-generation
23 fighters.

24 (17) A decision to terminate or delay the next
25 generation bomber would severely diminish the abil-

1 ity of the United States to project power on a global
2 scale in the future.

3 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON CONTINUED DEVELOP-**
4 **MENT OF THE NEXT GENERATION BOMBER**
5 **IN FISCAL YEAR 2010.**

6 It is the policy of the United States—

7 (1) to pursue a development program for the
8 next generation bomber during fiscal year 2010, in
9 accordance with the guidance established in the
10 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, including the full
11 authorization and appropriation of appropriate
12 funds; and

13 (2) not to delay the next generation bomber de-
14 velopment program by deliberations on the 2010
15 Quadrennial Defense Review, deliberations on the
16 Nuclear Posture Review, or negotiations over the fol-
17 low-on Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

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